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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 This appeal arises from the convictions of four men 
belonging to a violent heroin trafficking organization that 
operated out of Atlantic City, New Jersey. Over the course of 
two and a half years, law enforcement officials documented 
the extensive reach of this organization and the crimes its 
members committed. Thirty-four people were charged with 
drug-trafficking related offenses as a result of the 
investigation. They include the four defendant/appellants 
here: Kareem Bailey, Terry Davis, Lamar Macon, and 
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Dominique Venable.2 A jury convicted them of conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin within 
1,000 feet of a public housing complex, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), and 21 
U.S.C. § 860, use or possession of a firearm in furtherance of 
that drug trafficking offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and use of a 
communication facility to further a drug conspiracy, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The jury also convicted Terry 
Davis of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  
 On appeal, Bailey, Davis, Macon, and Venable make 
four principal arguments for reversal. They contend that: (1) 
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support their 
convictions; (2) the district court should have suppressed the 
government’s wiretapping evidence; (3) the district court 
violated Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 when it 
admitted certain evidence regarding a drug-trafficking-related 
murder and a drug-trafficking-related assault; and (4) the 
district court abused its discretion when it declined to order a 
mistrial on two different grounds. Bailey further contends that 
the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 
of his past convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute and possession of a firearm. The defendants’ first, 
second, and fourth arguments are entirely without merit. 
However, their Rule 403 claim merits serious consideration. 
As we will explain, we agree that the district court violated 
Rule 403 when it admitted certain evidence. Nonetheless, 
given the overwhelming amount of other evidence of guilt, 
we hold that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the convictions.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Derry Drug Trafficking Organization 
 Bailey, Davis, Macon, and Venable were associates in 
a violent heroin-trafficking organization that operated out of 
the Stanley Holmes Public Housing Village in Atlantic City, 
New Jersey. This organization was led by Mykal Derry and 
known as the Derry Drug Trafficking Organization (DDTO). 
                                              
2 For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the 
defendants/appellants as either “defendant” or “defendants” 
throughout this opinion. 
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Derry purchased large quantities of heroin from three New 
Jersey suppliers and distributed the heroin in “bundles” (ten 
wax envelopes of heroin) and “bricks” (five bundles) to 
members of the DDTO. These DDTO associates then sold the 
heroin in and around the public housing complex. 
Investigators estimated that Derry received 717 bricks of 
heroin for distribution from October 2012 to February 2013. 
The DDTO maintained control of its drug-trafficking turf by 
assaulting, robbing, and killing rival drug dealers.  
 In July of 2010, the FBI began investigating the 
DDTO in conjunction with state and local law enforcement 
agencies. At first, confidential informants and undercover 
police officers made a series of controlled buys that were 
captured on audio and video recordings. By October, officers 
had identified Mykal Derry as the leader of the organization. 
For the next two years, police relied on confidential 
informants, controlled buys, physical surveillance, phone 
records, pen registers, and intercepted prison phone calls 
placed from the Atlantic County Jail to map the scope of the 
DDTO’s operations.  
However, the investigators eventually found these 
techniques inadequate to uncover the full reach of the 
conspiracy. In an attempt to remedy this, the government 
secured authorization for a wiretap from the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey in October 2012. 
Wiretaps on the phones of Mykal Derry and one of his 
suppliers, Tyrone Ellis, revealed many DDTO co-conspirators 
that police had previously been unaware of as well as new 
evidence regarding the organization’s criminal activities. 
Overall, law enforcement intercepted and recorded 
approximately 6,700 pertinent calls over the course of their 
investigation.  
In addition to these wiretaps, investigators obtained 
critical information from Kareem Young, a member of the 
DDTO. He eventually “flipped” and became a government 
informant. Prior to cooperating with the government, Young 
sold drugs for Derry, obtaining them directly from him. 
Young explained the inner workings of the DDTO to 
investigators, and he described the defendants’ roles in the 
organization.  
B. District Court Proceedings 
 A federal grand jury returned a fifteen-count 
indictment against fifteen defendants, including the four in 
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this consolidated appeal. Thereafter, the grand jury returned a 
125-count superseding indictment against nineteen 
defendants, including these four defendants. The issues raised 
in this appeal pertain to the following charges in that 
indictment: (1) Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with 
Intent to Distribute Heroin within 1000 Feet of a Public 
Housing Complex, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), and 21 U.S.C. § 860 (drug 
conspiracy count); (2) Use or Possession of a Firearm in 
Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Offense, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (firearm count); (3) Use of a 
Communication Facility to Further a Drug Conspiracy, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (phone count); and (4) 
Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession count). While all 
four defendants were charged in the first three of those 
counts, only Terry Davis was charged in the fourth. The 
indictment alleged that the charged conspiracy lasted “[f]rom 
in or about October 2010 through in or about March 2013.”3  
 Given logistical hurdles arising from the number of 
individuals indicted, the district court established three groups 
of defendants who would be tried separately. The four 
defendants here were among those joined in the first group to 
be tried. All four were subsequently convicted on all counts 
charged against them, except one phone count on which 
Bailey was acquitted. Davis received an aggregate sentence of 
240 months’ imprisonment in accordance with the applicable 
mandatory minimums. Venable was sentenced to 240 months; 
Bailey to 241 months; and Macon to 240 months. 
 Defendants now raise overlapping and individual 
challenges to their convictions. They raise four principal 
arguments. First, they contend that the government did not 
present sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. 
Second, Bailey, Venable, and Macon argue that the district 
court should have suppressed the evidence obtained through 
the wiretaps. Third, they claim that the district court violated 
Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 when it permitted 
the government to present evidence of a murder committed by 
Mykal Derry’s brother, Malik Derry. Bailey and Macon also 
argue that the district court violated Rule 403 when it 
                                              
3 Appendix for Kareem Bailey (Bailey J.A.) at 2. 
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permitted the government to present evidence of another 
drug-trafficking-related assault that DDTO members carried 
out. Bailey further appeals the district court’s admission of 
his prior convictions under Rules 404(b) and 403. Fourth and 
finally, Venable, Bailey, and Macon claim there are three 
different grounds for a mistrial that were erroneously denied. 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that only one of the 
defendants’ evidentiary challenges has any merit. 
Nonetheless, the resulting error was harmless.4  
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE CLAIM 
A. The Heroin-Trafficking Conspiracy Charge 
 All four defendants contend that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support their convictions 
for membership in a heroin-trafficking conspiracy and use (or 
possession) of a firearm in furtherance of that drug trafficking 
conspiracy.5 To prove they were members of a drug-
trafficking conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the 
government must establish: (1) a shared unity of purpose 
between the alleged conspirators, (2) an intent to achieve a 
common goal, and (3) an agreement to work together toward 
that goal.6 We can infer such a conspiracy when evidence of 
related facts and circumstances make clear that the defendants 
could not have carried out their activities “‘except as the 
result of a preconceived scheme or common 
understanding.’”7 The government “need not prove that each 
defendant knew all of the conspiracy’s details, goals, or other 
participants.”8 Furthermore, the government is entitled to 
prove these elements entirely through circumstantial 
                                              
4 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231; we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
5 They do not challenge their convictions for use of a 
communication facility to further a drug conspiracy. 
6 United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 
7 United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(quoting United States v. Ellis, 595 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 
1979)). 
8 United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 343 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citing United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 593 
(3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by United States 
v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 727 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
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evidence.9 Indeed, “‘[i]t is not unusual that the government 
will not have direct evidence. Knowledge is often proven by 
circumstances. A case can be built against the defendant 
grain-by-grain until the scale finally tips.’”10 
 In drug conspiracy cases, the government must prove 
that the defendants were not merely engaged in “buyer-seller” 
relationships with their suppliers.11 Instead, the government 
must prove that the defendants were actually members of the 
drug-trafficking conspiracy. We discussed the problem of 
differentiating between one who merely buys drugs from a 
drug conspiracy, and one who is an actual member of the 
conspiracy, in United States v. Gibbs.12 Gibbs teaches that the 
factors that demonstrate a defendant was part of a conspiracy 
rather than in a mere buyer/seller relationship with that 
conspiracy include: (1) “the length of affiliation between the 
defendant and the conspiracy”; (2) “whether there is an 
established method of payment”; (3) “the extent to which 
transactions are standardized”; (4) “whether there is a 
demonstrated level of mutual trust”; (5) whether “transactions 
involved large amounts of drugs”; and (6) whether the 
defendant purchased his drugs on credit.13 These factors do 
not necessarily establish membership in a conspiracy as 
opposed to a buyer-seller relationship, but “their presence 
suggests that a defendant has full knowledge of, if not a stake 
in, a conspiracy.”14 As we acknowledged in Gibbs:  
[W]hen a defendant drug buyer has repeated, 
familiar dealings with members of a conspiracy, 
that buyer probably comprehends fully the 
nature of the group with whom he is dealing, is 
more likely to depend heavily on the conspiracy 
as the sole source of his drugs, and is more 
likely to perform drug-related acts for 
                                              
9 Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 197 (citing United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
10 United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 431 
(3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
11 Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 197. 
12 Id. at 188. 
13 Id. at 199. 
14 Id. 
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conspiracy members in an effort to maintain his 
connection to them.15  
 
Of course, merely comprehending the nature of the group one 
purchases from does not change a person who is otherwise 
only a purchaser into a conspirator, and Gibbs does not hold 
otherwise.16 Moreover, in Gibbs, Judge Becker also urged us 
to consider “whether the buyer can be said to have a stake in 
the larger conspiracy,” beyond the buyer/seller relationship.17  
 Our standard of review in sufficiency of the evidence 
challenges is highly deferential.18 A sufficiency challenge 
fails if, “‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’”19 In reviewing its sufficiency, the 
evidence is “view[ed] . . . as a whole,”20 not piecemeal, and 
we do “‘not weigh evidence or determine the credibility of 
witnesses.’”21 Furthermore, when the facts support conflicting 
inferences, we “must presume—even if it does not 
affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact 
                                              
15 Id. 
16 For example, one who regularly purchases his drugs from a 
drug cartel fully understands the overarching nature of the 
organization from which he purchases. However, that does 
not ipso facto transform that purchaser into a co-conspirator. 
There is clearly a distinction between knowing one is 
purchasing from a cartel and having a shared interest in the 
business of that cartel.  
17 Id. at 198, n.3. 
18 United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 386 (3d Cir. 2015). 
Our review of sufficiency of the evidence challenges is 
plenary. See United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 150, 152 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
19 Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 424-25 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979)).  
20 Centeno, 793 F.3d at 386. 
21 Id. (quoting United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 
(3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and 
must defer to that resolution.”22 
 We further clarified the application of this deferential 
standard to drug conspiracy cases in a relatively recent en 
banc decision, United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez.23 There, 
we emphasized that in “a sufficiency of the evidence 
challenge in [a] drug conspiracy case[],” we are “not to act as 
a thirteenth juror.”24 We further admonished that “in this 
particular area—drug conspiracy cases—it appears that we 
[too frequently] examined sufficiency by looking at the 
evidence under a microscope.”25 Such inspection is not 
warranted: “Too often, we failed to ask whether any 
reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant knew the 
transaction involved drugs; instead, we reassessed the 
evidence independently.”26 In closing, we stressed: 
While evidence proffered at trial may be 
consistent with multiple possibilities, our role as 
a reviewing court is to uphold the jury verdict—
and not to usurp the role of the jury—as long as 
it passes the “bare rationality” test. Reversing 
the jury’s conclusion simply because another 
inference is possible—or even equally 
plausible—is inconsistent with the proper 
inquiry for review of sufficiency of the 
evidence challenges . . . . It is up to the jury—
not the district court judge or our Court—to 
examine the evidence and draw inferences.27 
 
The defendants must therefore clear a high hurdle to prevail 
on their challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
 Here, there is considerable evidence that the DDTO 
was a drug trafficking organization, of which each of the 
defendants was a member. Kareem Young testified that Derry 
sold him and other DDTO associates bricks of heroin, some 
                                              
22 McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
23 726 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
24 Id. at 431. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 432. 
27 Id.  
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of which Young paid for upon delivery and some of which he 
obtained on credit. Young explained that he and other DDTO 
associates stored heroin and guns inside trap houses that they 
operated at the Stanley Holmes Village apartments. He also 
stated that if a rival drug dealer attempted to sell heroin on 
DDTO “turf,” DDTO associates would beat, rob, and/or shoot 
the invader. 
 Regarding the four defendants here, Young first 
testified that Derry provided heroin to Macon from 2011 
through 2013, and Macon resold the heroin in Atlantic City 
on a daily basis. Young also stated that Derry sold Macon 
heroin on credit. Wiretapped phone calls between Macon and 
Derry corroborate this testimony. The wiretaps also captured 
a conversation between Derry and Macon in which Macon 
warned Derry about police surveillance. This fact suggests 
that Macon had a stake in the continued viability of Derry’s 
drug operation. Similarly, police recorded Macon directing 
heroin customers to Derry. This evidence was more than 
sufficient to establish that Macon had an interest in the Derry 
conspiracy and, thus, was a member of it.  
 The evidence also established Davis was a member. In 
fact, Davis served as an “enforcer” for the group. Davis 
carried firearms to protect DDTO associates during heroin 
sales. Young testified that Derry delivered heroin to Davis for 
redistribution, occasionally providing it on credit. Intercepted 
conversations corroborated Young’s testimony against Davis. 
The prosecution also presented other examples of Davis’s 
active membership in the DDTO. These examples included 
recorded conversations about an incident in which Davis 
rented a hide-away room at the Trump Taj Mahal Casino for 
Derry after Derry and his brother Malik murdered a member 
of a rival gang. This evidence was enough to allow a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Derry and Davis had a shared 
interest in the success of the DDTO. 
 Venable’s attempt to distance himself from 
membership in the DDTO fares no better. Young recounted 
that Derry sold heroin to Venable in 2011 and 2012, 
occasionally providing it to him on credit. Moreover, Venable 
conceded in his brief that “direct proof . . . of Venable’s 
membership in the conspiracy”28 came from Young. The 
                                              
28 Venable Br. at 23. 
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government also corroborated Young’s testimony with 
intercepted phone conversations, including one in which 
Derry instructed Venable to go to the bathroom of a 
McDonald’s restaurant in Atlantic City and sell heroin to a 
customer there. Like Macon, Venable referred heroin 
customers to Derry so that Derry could make the sale himself.  
 The government also presented sufficient evidence of 
Bailey’s membership in the DDTO drug conspiracy. 
Recorded calls revealed Bailey setting up sales for Derry. 
Bailey, like Macon, also acted as a lookout for the DDTO. 
Lastly, the evidence included recorded conversations between 
Derry and Bailey in which the two discussed collecting 
money from other DDTO associates so that they could post 
bail for Davis and another DDTO co-conspirator.  
This evidence establishes several important Gibbs 
factors. First, as Gibbs teaches, “[a] large transaction or an 
accumulation of deals suggests more trust, garnered over a 
period of time, as well as a greater likelihood that the parties 
have ‘put their heads together’ to figure out planning, 
organization, and ways to conceal their activities.”29  
The fact that Macon and Davis obtained heroin from 
Derry on credit with some regularity further shows the 
trusting and continuing nature of the relationship between 
them. This trust is indicative of membership in a conspiracy 
rather than merely purchasing from it.  
A credit relationship may well reflect the kind 
of trust that is referenced supra, and often 
evidences the parties’ mutual stake in each 
other’s transactions. By extending credit to a 
buyer, the seller risks the possibility that the 
buyer will be unable to resell the drugs: even if 
the buyer does successfully resell the drugs, in 
this generally thinly capitalized “business,” the 
seller will likely have to wait until the buyer 
collects the money from his resale before he can 
pay the seller back for the initial purchase. In 
addition, the buyer has a vested interest in the 
seller’s ability to maintain a good working 
relationship with his supplier, since the buyer 
                                              
29 United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 1999).  
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will not profit unless the drugs continue to flow 
from the seller's supplier to the seller.30 
 
 The fact that Bailey, Macon, and Davis occasionally 
advanced the DDTO by serving as lookouts are also 
indicative of membership in the conspiracy. We have 
explained that when a defendant “acted as a lookout [while an 
alleged coconspirator] conducted drug sales, [] that fact alone 
may well have been enough to show the existence of a 
conspiracy between” those persons.31  
 Accordingly, it is abundantly clear that all four of 
these defendants had a stake in the DDTO organization and 
actively worked to advance the goals of that organization; 
these were goals from which each of these defendants shared 
and benefitted. This evidence is clearly sufficient to establish 
each of the defendants’ membership in the charged 
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, and their protestations 
to the contrary are unpersuasive.32  
B. The Firearm Possession Charge 
 The defendants further claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that they possessed, carried, or used 
firearms in furtherance of the heroin-trafficking conspiracy. 
This argument is only slightly better than their claim that the 
evidence was not sufficient to establish their membership in 
the DDTO conspiracy. To prove the firearms charge, the 
government had to prove that:  
(1) the defendant committed either the crime of 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 
to distribute a controlled substance or the crime 
of possession with intent to distribute; (2) the 
defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and 
(3) the defendant knowingly possessed the 
firearm in furtherance of the crime of 
                                              
30 Id. at 200. 
31 United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2001). 
32 The fact that much of the evidence of the defendants’ 
participation in the conspiracy came from one co-conspirator 
does not undermine our conclusion. See United States v. 
Boria, 592 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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conspiracy to distribute or in furtherance of the 
crime of possession with intent to distribute.33  
 
 However, since the government charged a conspiracy, 
it need not prove that each defendant himself personally used 
a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. Instead, under 
Pinkerton v. United States,34 each member of the charged 
conspiracy is liable for the substantive crimes his co-
conspirators commit in furtherance of the conspiracy even if 
he neither participates in his co-conspirators’ crimes nor has 
any knowledge of them, absent the following three exceptions 
to that rule.35 A defendant may not be held liable for the 
offenses of his co-conspirators if: (1) “the substantive offense 
committed by one of the conspirators was not in fact done in 
furtherance of the conspiracy,”36 (2) the substantive offense 
committed by one of the conspirators “did not fall within the 
scope of the unlawful project,”37 or (3) the substantive 
offense committed by one of the conspirators “could not be 
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of 
the unlawful agreement.”38 
 Here, the government introduced considerable 
evidence of the DDTO’s profligate use of firearms to further 
the common interests of the conspirators. Young testified that 
the DDTO associates engaged in numerous shootings, 
targeting rival drug dealers and former DDTO associates in 
an effort to maintain DDTO control over the drug-trafficking 
trade in the Stanley Holmes area. For example, Young 
explained that Derry and another DDTO associate assaulted a 
former DDTO associate named Anthony Rosario after 
Rosario stopped buying heroin from Derry. After Rosario 
reported the assault to the police, Derry ordered his cousin to 
shoot Rosario.  
  The government introduced evidence that Macon, 
Davis, Venable, and Bailey either committed the substantive 
                                              
33 United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 2006). 
34 328 U.S. 640 (1946). 
35 United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1135 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing Pinkerton). 
36 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647. 
37 Id. at 647-48. 
38 Id. at 648. 
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crime of possession in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 
conspiracy or else met Pinkerton’s standard for co-
conspirator liability. As previously explained, “As long as [a 
conspirator’s] action was within the purview of the 
conspiracy, his co-conspirators are as liable for his gun as if 
they had carried the firearm themselves.”39  
Young told the jury that when he and Macon were 
selling heroin one night in the Stanley Holmes Village, 
Macon asked Young if he was “strapped” (i.e. armed), and 
Young assured Macon that he was. Macon also spent time in 
DDTO trap houses where firearms were openly displayed.  
Young further explained that he repeatedly saw Davis 
carrying guns, and that Davis was an “enforcer” for the 
DDTO. Law enforcement also intercepted conversations 
between Davis and another DDTO associate regarding a 
shooting that a DDTO associate carried out against rival drug 
dealers.  
According to Young, Venable regularly carried a 
loaded .22 caliber rifle with a sawed-off barrel to shoot at 
rival drug dealers. The police seized a sawed-off, .22 caliber 
rifle from Venable, thus corroborating Young’s testimony. 
Moreover, Young testified that Venable admitted that he was 
involved in a shooting on rival drug turf. The presence of a 
discharged .22 caliber shell casing found at the scene of the 
shooting corroborated this testimony.  
Young testified that Bailey possessed “firearms at 
times while he was selling drugs or engaged in the business of 
selling drugs in and around” the Stanley Holmes Village and 
other locations. After Bailey was arrested, Derry told Bailey 
that he was glad that Bailey “wasn’t strapped” when he was 
arrested, and Bailey acknowledged his ownership of a gun 
(“my joint”). 
                                              
39 United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1135 (3d Cir. 
1990) (stating that the evidence was sufficient to prove that a 
coconspirator’s “use of his weapon was both foreseeable to . . 
. [his co-conspirator] . . . and within the scope of the 
conspiracy”); see United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 427 
(3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]here was sufficient evidence that Casiano 
could have reasonably foreseen the use of a gun by his co-
conspirators.”); United States v. Ramos, 147 F.3d 281, 286 
(3d Cir. 1998) (same). 
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This evidence is sufficient to establish actual 
possession of firearms in furtherance of drug-trafficking 
activity. It is also more than enough proof that each defendant 
conspired to possess them for that purpose. There was also 
evidence that Davis, Venable, and Bailey carried firearms 
during drug sales, supporting the inference that they relied on 
these firearms to enforce and protect their drug business. 
Venable even appears to have used his firearm in drug-related 
shootings.  
Even without this direct evidence, the government 
produced sufficient evidence to prove that all four defendants 
knew the DDTO used guns in furtherance of the drug 
conspiracy. All four were aware of numerous drug-related 
DDTO shootings, saw firearms in trap houses, and knew that 
the DDTO used armed, i.e. “strapped,” enforcers.  
III. THE WIRETAP EVIDENCE CHALLENGE 
 Bailey, Macon, and Venable claim that the government 
failed to establish “necessity” for its wiretaps. Thus, they 
contend that the district court erred in not suppressing the 
evidentiary “fruits” of those wiretaps. According to the 
defendants, the investigators obtained sufficient information 
through “traditional investigative techniques,” such as 
controlled purchases of heroin, physical surveillance, review 
of telephone records, and confidential informants. The record 
is to the contrary. 
 The team that investigated this case used nearly every 
technique in the book before requesting authorization for a 
wiretap. They ultimately applied for a wiretap only when it 
became clear that the less invasive techniques they had been 
using were not effective. Those methods did not disclose the 
full scope of the DDTO’s conspiracy. We review the district 
court’s approval of the wiretap application for clear error, 
while exercising plenary review over its legal 
determinations.40  
 The statute governing the authorization of wiretaps, 
Title III,41 requires the government to demonstrate necessity 
when applying for wiretap authorization. More specifically, 
wiretap applications must contain “a full and complete 
                                              
40 United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752, 758 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
41 18 U.S.C. § 2518. 
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statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures 
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to 
be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”42 The 
purpose of the necessity requirement is “to make doubly sure 
that the statutory authority be used with restraint and only 
where the circumstances warrant the surreptitious interception 
of wire and oral communications.”43 The Supreme Court has 
emphasized that “[t]hese procedures [are] not to be routinely 
employed as the initial step in criminal investigation.”44 
  A district court may approve a wiretap application 
when the government demonstrates that “normal investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous.”45 We have acknowledged that “18 U.S.C. § 
2518(3)(c) does not require the government to exhaust all 
other investigative procedures before resorting to electronic 
surveillance.”46 “The government need only lay a factual 
predicate sufficient to inform the judge why other methods of 
investigation are not sufficient.”47 Ultimately, we apply the 
necessity requirement in a “practical and common sense 
fashion.”48  
                                              
42 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). 
43 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974). 
44 Id.  
45 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). 
46 United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 418 (3d Cir. 
1997); see also United States v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 238, 243 
(4th Cir. 2014) (observing that necessity was shown where 
the affidavit described “at length the steps that police officers 
had taken . . . in investigating” a drug-trafficking conspiracy, 
“addressing at least ten alternative investigatory procedures,” 
included “physical surveillance, analyzing telephone toll 
records, and affixing GPS devices”; “those methods had 
failed to reveal the full scope of the organization, showing 
instead that members of this organization [were] extremely 
cautious in their movements and activities” (alternation in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
47 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
48 United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 37 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Here, law enforcement either exhausted the normal 
investigative techniques available to them or else reasonably 
concluded that such procedures were unlikely to succeed if 
tried. The affidavit in support of the wiretaps lays this out in 
exhaustive detail. The investigators first recruited confidential 
informants who made controlled purchases of heroin from 
Derry and other DDTO associates. Investigators used 
physical surveillance of most of the controlled purchases of 
heroin from Derry. Investigators also obtained information 
from recorded prison telephones involving incarcerated 
DDTO associates.  
 These techniques proved to be insufficient. The 
confidential informants bought heroin almost exclusively 
from Derry and did not “know all” of his confederates. They 
also could not ascertain the DDTO’s “method(s) or source(s) 
of supply, nor locations used for storage, packaging or 
distribution.”49 Investigators “believed that if [Derry] was 
arrested for” selling heroin, the DDTO “would continue to 
distribute narcotics, and continue to engage in violence.”50 
Thus, arresting Derry alone would have frustrated the goals of 
the broader investigation.  
 Law enforcement further determined that other, less 
invasive investigative techniques would also fail to reveal the 
full scope of the DDTO’s operations. Continued physical 
surveillance was likely to be fruitless because most of the 
associates were surveillance conscious, avoiding locations 
that were visible to security cameras. They were also 
occasionally aware of surveillance vehicles when they were 
present (some of these defendants even alerted each other to 
the presence of surveillance vehicles). Investigators also 
determined that searches of the targets’ trash would provide 
little relevant evidence because trash at the Stanley Holmes 
Village was thrown into communal dumpsters and could not 
be attributed to particular tenants. 
 Law enforcement also decided that the execution of 
search warrants would be futile because such searches would 
alert DDTO associates to the existence of the investigation, 
thereby leading to the concealment or destruction of evidence 
before police could identify all drug stash locations. 
                                              
49 Supplemental Appendix 694 (Affidavit ¶ 92). 
50 Supplemental Appendix 698 (Affidavit ¶ 102). 
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Additionally, execution of search warrants “in and of 
themselves, would [not] meet the goals and objectives of this 
investigation” because the “[e]vidence seized would only 
implicate the individual directly associated with the 
respective property[] and not the entire organization.”51 And 
perhaps most importantly, the investigators determined that 
DDTO associates were unlikely to cooperate with law 
enforcement officials due, in large part, to the threat of 
retribution.  
 As the government explained in its affidavit, Derry 
largely conducted his business over cell phones, using seven 
different mobile telephones an average of 205 times per day. 
In a final attempt to avoid applying for wiretap authorization, 
investigators first obtained judicial approval to install pen 
registers and trap-and-trace devices as well as collect global 
positioning satellite information on Derry’s mobile 
telephones. These devices enabled officers to track Derry’s 
location and contacts without allowing them to listen to the 
substance of his calls. However, police were still unable to 
ascertain the identities of the people speaking to Derry on the 
phone. It was therefore necessary for the government to 
obtain more precise information regarding Derry’s cell phone 
use. 
 Moreover, as the government explains in its brief, the 
“value of historical telephone usage information was limited 
by the fact that targets occasionally used ‘pre-paid’ 
telephones or ‘drop phones’―for which service providers 
were not required to maintain subscriber information―or 
used fictitious names to subscribe for telephone service.”52 
Furthermore, although the GPS data informed police when 
targets were at particular locations, investigators could not 
prove they were engaged in criminal activity. Thus, over two 
years into the investigation, law enforcement applied for and 
received wiretap authorization. The government’s wiretap 
affidavit detailed each of the investigative steps law 
enforcement had previously attempted and explained with 
precision why other techniques would prove fruitless. 
                                              
51 Supplemental Appendix 702 (Affidavit ¶ 114).  
52 Gov’t Br. at 53 (citing Supplemental Appendix 710-11 
(Affidavit ¶¶ 130, 132)). 
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 Far from being inadequate to justify authorization of a 
wiretap, the government’s application here is a textbook 
model of care and thoroughness, and the individuals who 
prepared it are to be commended. With meticulous and 
painstaking care, they clearly explained the government’s 
need for the wiretap authorization and why, absent that 
information, the government would only be able to arrest 
Derry and a few other key DDTO associates. As we have 
previously explained, even where “normal investigative 
techniques might have been sufficient to implicate” the 
conspiracy leader in drug trafficking, “such approaches” are 
sometimes insufficient to determine “the scope of the 
conspiracy or the nature of [the conspiracy leader’s] on-going 
criminal activity.”53 Investigations are not limited “to crimes 
which can be probed satisfactorily by normal methods.”54 
Instead, “[i]n the proper circumstances, the instrumentalities 
of Title III may be employed to discover the full extent of 
crimes and conspiracies.”55  
 In United States v. Armocida,56 we explained that 
“[a]lthough the government ha[d] actual knowledge of a 
conspiracy and evidence sufficient to prosecute one of the 
conspirators, it [would have been] unrealistic to require the 
termination of an investigation before the entire scope of the 
narcotics distribution network [was] uncovered and the 
identity of its participants learned.”57 The same is true here. 
The government established that a wiretap was necessary to 
uncover the full scope of the DDTO’s operation, despite the 
fact that law enforcement had enough evidence without it to 
arrest Mykal Derry. 
 Moreover, as previously explained, the government 
was not required to show that all other investigative methods 
would have been ineffective (even though the government 
appears to have made such a showing here). “It is sufficient 
that the government show that other techniques are 
impractical under the circumstances and that it would be 
unreasonable to require pursuit of those avenues of 
                                              
53 United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 850 (3d Cir. 1976). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 515 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1975). 
57 Id. at 38.  
21 
 
investigation.”58 As long as the wiretap affidavit is prepared 
in detail, recounting the investigative methods that were 
attempted and why other methods would prove ineffective, as 
they were here, we have no difficulty concluding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
the affidavit supported a finding of necessity. 
IV. RULE 403 AND 404(B) CLAIMS 
A. Evidence of the James Murder 
 The district court permitted the government to present 
evidence that Mykal Derry and his brother Malik murdered a 
rival heroin trafficker named Tyquinn James for selling drugs 
on their turf. The evidence was admitted to prove the firearm 
and drug trafficking conspiracy charges.  
 On February 10, 2013, Malik Derry shot Tyquinn 
James at extremely close range outside a populated fast food 
restaurant and liquor store in Atlantic City. A security camera 
outside the restaurant partially captured the murder on video. 
At trial, the district court permitted the government to present 
both the video recording of this murder as well as non-video 
evidence—testimony and recorded conversations—discussing 
the murder. Davis, Bailey, Macon, and Venable argue that the 
district court erred in admitting both the video and non-video 
evidence of the James murder under Federal Rule of Evidence 
403. Davis also argues that the evidence was inadmissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
 We conclude that the district court did not err in 
admitting the non-video evidence of the James murder. Given 
the nature of the charged conspiracy, that evidence was more 
probative than prejudicial and therefore admissible under 
Rule 403. However, we are extremely troubled by the district 
court’s decision to allow the surveillance video of that 
shooting into evidence. The video depicted a brutal murder; it 
was not necessary to establish the government’s stated 
purpose in seeking its admission, and the probative value of 
this video—if any—was vastly outweighed by the significant 
risk of undue prejudice and emotion it most likely stimulated 
in the jury. As we shall explain, the district court should not 
have admitted this tape into evidence.  Nevertheless, even 
though we are disturbed by this error and the prosecution’s 
tactic, given the plethora of evidence of guilt of each of these 
                                              
58 Vento, 533 F.2d at 849.  
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defendants, we hold that this error was harmless. We address 
each of these issues in turn, beginning with the non-video 
evidence. 
1. The Non-Video James Murder Evidence 
i. Standard of Review 
 We generally review a district court’s evidentiary 
findings for abuse of discretion.59 This standard requires us to 
afford district courts “broad discretion on evidentiary rulings” 
due to their “familiarity with the details” of the cases in front 
of them and their “greater experience in evidentiary 
matters.”60 “In order to justify reversal, a district court’s 
analysis and resulting conclusion must be arbitrary or 
irrational.”61  Nevertheless, when reviewing a district court’s 
admission of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 
we do not afford that court the deference normally afforded 
when we review for abuse of discretion if the district court 
failed to engage in on-the-record balancing.  
 Rule 403 states: “The court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”62 When determining whether evidence violates 
Rule 403, district courts must balance the probative value of 
the evidence against its prejudicial effect, clarifying its 
reasoning on-the-record.63 This requirement not only provides 
                                              
59 United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
60 United States v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
61 Schneider, 801 F.3d at 198 (internal alternations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
62 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
63 See United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 283-84 (3d 
Cir. 2014), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2014); United States v. 
Smith, 725 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the 
district court’s balancing must be apparent from the record); 
United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“When a court engages in a Rule 403 balancing and 
articulates on the record a rational explanation, we will rarely 
disturb its ruling. Where, however, the court failed to perform 
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the defendants with an explanation of the district court’s 
reasoning, but also enables appellate courts to understand the 
district court’s logic. If a district court does not conduct this 
on-the-record balancing, we either remand the case to the 
district court or, where practical, undertake this balancing 
ourselves.64  
 Here, Davis contends that the district court abused its 
discretion because it failed to conduct the requisite on-the-
record balancing with respect to the video evidence of the 
James murder. Although Davis does not raise this argument 
with respect to the non-video evidence, we will address this 
point with respect to all evidence of the James murder as it 
dictates the degree of deference we must afford the district 
court’s decision. We conclude that the district court 
articulated sufficient reasons, on-the-record, for admitting the 
non-video evidence of the James murder.  
 At trial, both parties briefed the Rule 403 issue with 
respect to both testimonial and video evidence, and the 
                                                                                                     
this analysis, or where its rationale is not apparent from the 
record, there is no way to review its discretion.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
64 See United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 388-91 
(3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court’s “underlying 
Rule 403 determination [was] not entitled to the full range of 
deference that we would normally give to it on appeal,” and 
then conducting our own Rule 403 analysis); United States v. 
Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 318-19 (3d Cir. 1997) (“When the 
record does not contain an adequate explanation of a trial 
judge’s Rule 403 ruling, a remand for clarification may be 
appropriate, but here we see no reason for a remand, because 
we see no basis on which the admission of the evidence in 
question could be sustained.”). When a district court fails to 
conduct the appropriate balancing, that omission does not per 
se necessitate reversal and remand. See United States v. 
Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 572 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Either way, the 
trial court’s failure to expressly articulate a Rule 403 balance 
when faced with a Rule 403 objection, would not be 
reversible error per se.”). Our Court can conduct the 
necessary balancing if the record provides the information 
needed for that determination. See Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 
388-91.  
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district court heard argument on the issues. The court then 
conducted the necessary balancing with respect to the non-
video evidence. First, the district court acknowledged that the 
evidence was prejudicial, but only in the way that all 
probative evidence is prejudicial. The court then rejected the 
defendants’ argument that the non-video evidence of the 
James murder was cumulative of other documentation of the 
DDTO’s drug-related violence. The court reasoned that 
nothing about this evidence was unfairly prejudicial and 
rejected the defendants’ Rule 403 argument. The district court 
considered a number of relevant factors in conducting its on-
the-record balancing. The balancing inquiry convinced the 
court that the testimonial and wiretapping evidence of the 
James murder should be admitted. Accordingly, we review 
that decision only for an abuse of discretion. We must 
therefore determine whether “‘the district court’s action was 
arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable,’ and ‘we will not 
disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion unless no 
reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.’”65 
ii. Admissibility of the Non-Video Evidence under Rule 403  
 We now turn to the merits of the district court’s Rule 
403 ruling as to the non-video evidence of the James murder. 
As previously stated, under Rule 403, a court may “exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”66 “When weighing the Rule 403 
factors, courts ‘must appraise the genuine need for the 
challenged evidence and balance that necessity against the 
                                              
65 United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal alterations omitted) (quoting Ansell v. Green Acres 
Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
66 Fed. R. Evid. 403; see United States v. Universal Rehab. 
Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 664 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(“As the text of [Rule 403] indicates, evidence that is 
otherwise relevant and admissible may only be excluded if 
the probative value of the evidence is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”).  
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risk of prejudice to the defendant.’”67 “Evidence cannot be 
excluded under Rule 403 merely because its unfairly 
prejudicial effect is greater than its probative value. Rather, 
evidence can be kept out only if its unfairly prejudicial effect 
‘substantially outweigh[s]’ its probative value.”68 Moreover, 
when evidence is highly probative, “even a large risk of 
unfair prejudice may be tolerable.”69 The converse is also 
true. When the probative value of evidence is tenuous, a 
relatively minor risk of substantial undue prejudice should 
counsel against admitting it.  
The evidence of the James murder was highly 
probative to the firearms charge. As previously explained, the 
government had to prove either that each defendant conspired 
to traffic heroin and knowingly possessed firearms in 
furtherance of that conspiracy70 or that their co-conspirators’ 
use of firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy was 
foreseeable under Pinkerton.71 At trial, the government 
argued that Derry and his brother killed James to eliminate 
competition with their drug-trafficking conspiracy. The 
government also proved that some of these defendants helped 
Derry hide from the authorities after the shooting. 
Accordingly, evidence of this murder—and the defendants’ 
knowledge of it—was very relevant to establishing whether 
use or possession of firearms in furtherance of the DDTO was 
reasonably foreseeable. Testimony about the murder was also 
highly probative of the defendants’ guilt of the charged 
firearm offense.72 Indeed, counsel for one of the defendants 
even conceded this fact in his brief. 
                                              
67 United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 302 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 
186 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
68 United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403); see Claxton, 766 F.3d at 302 
(quoting Cross). 
69 Cross, 308 F.3d at 323; see Claxton, 766 F.3d at 302 
(quoting Cross). 
70 United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 2006). 
71 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946). 
72 See United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 365 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2009) (holding that evidence of gang related shootings was 
relevant to the charged conspiracy because they “tended to 
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 The defendants nonetheless argue that the danger of 
unfair prejudice associated with this evidence outweighed its 
probative value. They point out that they offered a trial 
stipulation that DDTO associates murdered James. However, 
we have repeatedly acknowledged the Supreme Court’s 
canonical directive in Old Chief v. United States.73 There, the 
Court explained that the government is “entitled to prove its 
case free from any defendant’s option to stipulate the 
evidence away.”74 “That rule ‘rests on good sense’ because 
‘[a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a 
courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that 
would be used to prove it.’”75  
Moreover, if the government uses testimony or 
other tangible evidence to describe a series of 
events, but then interrupts that pattern by 
“announcing a stipulation or admission, the 
effect may be like saying, ‘never mind what’s 
behind the door,’ and jurors may well wonder 
what they are being kept from knowing,” or 
whether the government is “responsible for 
cloaking something.”76  
 
Thus, the government was entitled to present evidence of the 
James murder to the jury through testimony, rather than by 
stipulation. 
 Defendants also argue that evidence of the James 
murder was cumulative because evidence pertaining to other 
DDTO shootings was presented at trial. But Old Chief also 
teaches that “the mere fact that two pieces of evidence might 
                                                                                                     
show the gang’s hierarchal structure and expectations that 
lower-ranking members, . . . carry out the violent acts of 
retaliation, including murder, against other gangs to ensure 
one’s position within the Bloods, solidify its violent 
reputation, and protect its drug-distribution territory from 
rival gangs, among other things”).  
73 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997). 
74 Id.; see United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 387-88 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
75 Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 387 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. 
at 189).  
76 Id. at 388 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 189).  
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go to the same point would not . . . necessarily mean that only 
one of them might come in.”77 The fact that the government 
placed into evidence other examples of the DDTO’s violent 
offenses is certainly relevant to the Rule 403 balancing. 
However, such evidentiary submissions did not automatically 
foreclose the prosecution from eliciting testimony about the 
James murder. To counsel’s credit, Davis actually concedes 
this point. 
 The government stipulated to the fact that none of the 
defendants here actually murdered or plotted to murder 
James. Indeed, the government took pains to prove that Derry 
and his brother committed this murder. As we explained in 
United States v. Jones,78 such a stipulation mitigates the 
danger of unfair prejudice. In Jones, the government tried a 
gang member for conspiracy to commit murder and attempted 
murder. There, as here, the government introduced evidence 
that other gang members—not on trial—committed violent 
acts, including shootings.79 The defendant argued that 
evidence of other gang members’ violent crimes was more 
prejudicial than probative.80 In rejecting the defendant’s 
claim, we emphasized that there had not been any suggestion 
that the defendant had actually committed these crimes.81 The 
same is true here. Not only was there no suggestion that any 
of these defendants were implicated in the James murder, but 
also there was a stipulation to the contrary. Accordingly, we 
cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting the testimonial evidence of the James murder 
pursuant to Rule 403.  
2. The Video Evidence of the James Murder  
i. Standard of Review 
 In contrast to its treatment of the non-video evidence, 
the district court failed to conduct the requisite Rule 403 on-
the-record balancing with respect to the video of the James 
murder. Had it done so, it is difficult to see how it could have 
concluded that the probative value of this video outweighed 
its prejudicial impact.  
                                              
77 Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183. 
78 566 F.3d 353, 363-65 (3d Cir. 2009). 
79 Id. at 364-65. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 365. 
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 The extent of the district court’s balancing regarding 
this piece of evidence was an off-handed and rather casual 
remark that the video of James being shot in the head at point 
blank range “wasn’t very graphic.”82 With that comment, the 
district court concluded that the video evidence would be 
admitted. For reasons known only to the court, the judge 
added that the admission of this evidence would give the 
defendants “an appeal issue.”83 The court was right.  
 We have stated numerous times that a district court 
must provide a statement of reasons, on-the-record, 
explaining why it is admitting evidence over a Rule 403 
objection. In United States v. Caldwell,84 we explained that 
district courts must engage in “more than a bare recitation of 
Rule 403.”85 In Caldwell, the district court admitted evidence 
under Rule 403 after simply stating that the evidence in 
question was “more probative than prejudicial,” and 
accordingly its “probative value outweighs any prejudicial 
effect.”86 As we explained there, such a mantra-like recitation 
of the rule is no substitute for a specific explanation of why 
the evidence is admissible. “[W]e cannot infer such a 
‘rational explanation’ where the court merely recites the text 
of the rule.”87  
 Here, the district court failed to discuss the probative 
value of this evidence or even acknowledge the video’s 
potential for prejudice. Instead, the district court merely 
                                              
82 It may be that what is “graphic” is in the eye and furtive 
imagination of the beholder. This video was in black and 
white, and the resolution did not approach a high definition 
color video. However, an image of a person being gunned 
down on a sidewalk does not have to be shot in high 
definition, 3D, or virtual reality to be graphic. The absence of 
color and blood only slightly mitigates the gruesome nature of 
a life being instantly snuffed out on the sidewalk. 
83 “Why don’t you let it in so you have an appeal issue[?]” 
Bailey J.A. 2083. 
84 760 F.3d 267, 284 (3d Cir. 2014), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 
2014). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (quoting the district court below). 
87 Id. (quoting United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 
(3d Cir. 1992)).  
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recited the text of Rule 403 and concluded that the evidence 
was admissible—exactly what Caldwell prohibits. Because 
the district court’s “rationale is not apparent from the record,” 
we have “no way to review its discretion.”88 Therefore, we 
will not afford the district court’s decision the deference of 
abuse of discretion review. 
ii. Admissibility of the Video Evidence under Rule 403 
 
 In contrast to the non-video evidence, it is clear that 
the district court should not have admitted the video of the 
James murder. This video had a substantially greater risk of 
unfair prejudice than the testimonial and wiretap evidence 
because it graphically depicts what can only be described as a 
cold-blooded murder. The video shows James standing in 
front of a populated restaurant as Malik Derry rides up on a 
bicycle, draws his gun, and shoots James in the head at point 
blank range. Malik then casually rides away as James 
crumples and collapses to the ground. A child leaves the 
restaurant, staring at James’ body, as another passerby 
appears to call the police. Although no blood is visible in the 
video, it is nonetheless highly disturbing. As the government 
repeatedly emphasized in oral argument, the video depicts a 
ruthless murder, carried out by someone with no regard for 
human life. It is difficult to understand how the emotional 
impact of this video would not unfairly prejudice the jury 
against members of the DDTO.  
 Nonetheless, as we just explained, we will not disturb 
the district court’s determination unless the danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of 
evidence. We have little trouble concluding that it does. The 
government introduced abundant evidence to prove the James 
murder and its relationship to the charged drug conspiracy via 
recorded telephone conversations and testimony at trial. This 
video was not merely cumulative, it was a graphic depiction 
of an event that had already been thoroughly proven. This 
court89 and other circuit courts90 have clarified that probative 
                                              
88 Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889.  
89 See Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 389-91.  
90 See United States v. Wiggan, 700 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 
2012) (excluding evidence under Rule 403 where much of 
that evidence “was available in other forms—by alternative 
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value is “informed by the availability of alternative means to 
present similar evidence.”91 In Old Chief, the Supreme Court 
advised that the “Rule 403 ‘probative value’ of an item of 
evidence . . . may be calculated by comparing evidentiary 
alternatives.”92 As the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have 
recognized, “[t]here may be cases where the probative value 
of the evidence is so minimal that it will be obvious to the 
court that the potential prejudice to the defendant 
substantially outweighs any probative value the evidence 
might have.”93 This appeal presents such a case. The 
government had alternate, less prejudicial ways of presenting 
the James murder. This other evidence substantially reduced 
the probative value of the James video. 
 We explained this concept in United States v. 
Cunningham.94 That case involved the admission of 
cumulative evidence in the form of videos. The videos at 
issue depicted pre-pubescent children being bound, raped, and 
violently assaulted.95 The district court admitted two videos 
composed of seven shorter clips as proof of the child 
pornography charges, holding that these videos were more 
                                                                                                     
means—without risking the dangers of unfairness that use of 
a grand juror’s testimony would present”); United States v. 
Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
probative value is “informed by the availability of alternative 
means to present similar evidence”); Gross v. Black & Decker 
(U.S.), Inc., 695 F.2d 858, 863 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining 
that a factor to be taken into consideration in measuring 
admissibility of potentially prejudicial evidence is whether 
the same fact could have been proven by other evidence). 
91 Awadallah, 436 F.3d at 132. 
92 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997). 
93 United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 971 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(citing United States v. Gonzalez–Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 
1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where the evidence is of very slight (if 
any) probative value, it’s an abuse of discretion to admit it if 
there’s even a modest likelihood of unfair prejudice or a small 
risk of misleading the jury.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
94 694 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2012). 
95 Id. at 381-82, 390. 
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probative than prejudicial under Rule 403.96 Critically, the 
district court admitted these videos despite the availability of 
alternative means to prove the charged offense, including 
“witness testimony, still images, shorter video clips, [his] 
proffered stipulations, and/or the actual stipulations.”97 In 
reversing, we explained: 
Even though the two sets of videos were 
probative, [] the law of diminishing marginal 
returns still operates. The probative value of 
each clip was reduced by the existence of the 
clips before it. . . . As a result, after one excerpt 
from each video was displayed, the probative 
value of the remaining excerpts became 
diminished because knowledge . . . had already 
been established . . . by the prior video excerpts. 
Thus, any of the three excerpts from the first 
video would have diminished probative value if 
one or two of the other video excerpts from the 
first video had already been shown. Likewise, 
any of the four excerpts from the second video 
would have diminished probative value if one 
or two of the other video excerpts from the 
second video had already been shown. 98 
 
We held that the video excerpts should have been excluded 
because their “aggregate risk of unfair prejudice was 
tremendous” while their probative value was low given the 
availability of other evidence.99 Although “a district court ‘is 
not required to scrub the trial clean of all evidence that may 
have an emotional impact,’”100 Cunningham nonetheless 
stands for the principle that this emotional impact outweighs 
the probative value of evidence that is entirely redundant. 
“[T]he more video excerpts were shown, the more it became a 
                                              
96 Id. at 380. 
97 Id. at 387 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
98 Id. at 389-90. 
99 Id. at 390. 
100 Id. at 391 (quoting United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 
1124 (9th Cir. 2008)).  
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needless presentation of unfairly prejudicial and cumulative 
evidence.”101 
 Here, the James video was entirely redundant. Its only 
value lay in its emotional impact.102 The video had no 
probative value apart from its capacity to prejudice the jury 
against the defendants. When asked at oral argument what the 
value of the video was apart from its prejudicial shock value, 
the government repeatedly responded that the value of the 
video was its shock value: 
The Court: How does the fact that you see the 
guy get it in the head and drop like a rock tell 
you it’s this conspiracy? 
The Government: Well it’s this conspiracy 
because, there is other evidence that shows that 
it’s this conspiracy.  
The Court: Precisely. . . . Why did you need 
the video? What did the video get you except 
for the emotional wallop of seeing a guy go 
down with a bullet going through his head? 
The Government: What the video got, your 
honor, is it showed how the murder was 
committed in a way that no other evidence did. 
It shows that it was committed brazenly, when 
other people were standing around in a public 
area. . . . Malik Derry rides up and brazenly 
guns him down.103 
 
 In other words, the government argued that the video 
allowed it to elicit the emotion that Rule 403 is designed to 
prevent. As in Cunningham, “[w]e disagree with the 
government’s contention . . . that [the] video [] needed to be 
shown to ‘fully appreciate the nature of [the] crimes.’”104 
Given the availability of other evidence of the exact same 
                                              
101 Id.  
102 We, of course, are not suggesting that the video would 
have been properly admissible had the government refrained 
from introducing the recorded conversations about the murder 
or soliciting testimony about it from witnesses so that it could 
argue for admission of the more graphic video. 
103 Oral Argument at 33:00 minutes.  
104 Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 391. 
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crime, the government did not need the James video to prove 
the firearm or conspiracy charges.  
 It is hard to understand how the district court could 
have concluded that the relatively insignificant probative 
value of that video was not outweighed by its substantial 
prejudicial effect. Although the Supreme Court’s proscription 
in United States v. Berger105 is oft repeated, it seems all too 
often to resemble the falling tree that no one hears. In Berger, 
the Court unequivocally stated: “[The prosecutor] is in a 
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. . . . He 
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should 
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty 
to strike foul ones.”106 In other words, although ours is an 
adversarial system, prosecutors should never allow their 
overarching objective to be victory. “The United States 
Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.”107 As the Supreme Court has warned, 
the integrity of the criminal justice system is jeopardized 
when prosecutors adopt tactics which are governed by the 
sadly mistaken and dangerous principle that victory is the 
primary objective of a criminal prosecution. 
iii. Harmless Error Review 
 
 Our conclusion that the district court erred in admitting 
the James video does not end our inquiry: we must still 
review to see if the error was harmless. An evidentiary error 
is harmless if “it is highly probable that the error did not 
contribute to the judgment,”108 which “requires that the court 
possess a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 
defendant.”109  
 Here, we find that the district court’s erroneous 
admission of the James video was harmless. As previously 
described, the government presented abundant evidence of 
                                              
105 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 U.S. v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en 
banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
109 Id. at 1265 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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the drug-trafficking conspiracy, the firearm charge, and the 
defendants’ liability for each of these counts.110 Therefore, it 
is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.”111  
 In concluding that this error was harmless under the 
circumstances here, we caution that the doctrine of harmless 
error is not a license to engage in whatever prejudicial 
practices an attorney might feel he or she can get away with 
because the harmless error analysis will inoculate the end 
result against reversal on appeal.112 
3. Rule 404(b) Analysis 
 
 Davis alone argues that evidence of the James murder 
was extrinsic to the charged crimes and therefore subject to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).113 Rule 404(b) provides that 
“[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible 
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character.”114 Davis contends that the evidence of the James 
                                              
110 Ironically, the video could easily have been excluded 
under Rule 403 because it was so redundant given the other 
evidence of the James murder. 
111 Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1265. 
112 Chief Judge McKee notes that he will begin naming 
attorneys who engage in such tactics in his opinions in order 
to deter such conduct. He hopes that this practice will stress 
that harmless error review is not an invitation to resort to 
unduly prejudicial tactics merely because the evidence is 
strong enough to obtain a conviction that will likely be 
immunized against reversal by the harmless error doctrine. He 
invites his colleagues to do the same.  
113 The James murder evidence is intrinsic to the conspiracy 
and firearm charges. See infra Part IV.c.2. The murder of a 
rival drug dealer who was encroaching on the DDTO’s turf 
directly proves the charged crimes of drug-trafficking 
conspiracy and use of a firearm in furtherance of that 
conspiracy. However, we need not reach this issue. Even if 
the murder evidence was extrinsic, Rule 404(b) only reaches 
the bad acts of a defendant himself—not the bad acts of 
others.  
114 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  
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murder should have been excluded under Rule 404(b). 
However, Rule 404(b) only applies to evidence of a 
defendant’s other bad acts or crimes, not those of third 
parties. In Huddleston v. United States,115 the Supreme Court 
explained, “[i]n the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence 
is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the 
act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.”116 The 
government stipulated that Davis did not commit the James 
murder. Accordingly, Rule 404(b) simply does not apply.117 
B. The Rosario Assault 
 
 In addition to the evidence of the James murder, the 
government presented evidence that DDTO associates 
assaulted a former member of the organization named 
Anthony Rosario. Rosario was a trafficker who obtained 
heroin from Mykal Derry until they had a falling out. When 
Rosario stopped buying heroin from Derry, Derry and another 
DDTO associate kidnapped Rosario, stole his car, and 
assaulted him. This assault occurred on October 30, 2010. 
When Rosario and his mother reported the kidnapping and 
assault to the police, Derry had his cousin, Kevin 
Washington, shoot Rosario on April 17, 2011, paralyzing 
him. The district court permitted the government to present 
evidence of this assault at trial over the appellants’ Rule 403 
objection. 
                                              
115 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). 
116 Id. (emphasis added). 
117 See id.; see also United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 287 
(2d Cir. 1994) (“Neither Montano, Brady nor their co-
defendants committed any of the murders testified about at 
their trial. The record contains no indication that the 
government ever attempted to make such an implication, nor 
that the court permitted it to be made. . . . Therefore, Rule 
404(b) is inapplicable to the evidence presented in this 
case.”); United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“In this conspiracy case, evidence of crimes, wrongs 
or acts by coconspirators is admissible, and such proof 
ordinarily does not raise any Rule 404(b) question.” (internal 
citation omitted)); United States v. Bates, 600 F.2d 505, 509 
(5th Cir. 1979) (same). 
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 On appeal, Bailey alone continues to contest the 
admission of this evidence.118 We conclude that the evidence 
was properly admitted. It was probative of the conspiracy and 
firearm charges, was not excessively cumulative, and was not 
unfairly prejudicial to the defendants. As the government 
explained in its closing argument, “evidence that the DDTO 
would violently protect its turf against interlopers such as 
Rosario strongly supported the government theory that, 
because these four defendants were selling heroin in [the 
Stanley Holmes Village], they were not mere ‘independent 
buyers’ from Derry.”119  
The Rosario evidence was particularly probative 
because of the timing of the assault. The Rosario assaults 
occurred on October 30, 2010 and April 17, 2011, earlier in 
the conspiracy than evidence of the other violent acts DDTO 
associates committed. Thus, “those assaults [] had a longer 
time to influence the thinking of others who might consider 
opposing the DDTO.”120 Finally, the government conceded 
that none of the defendants were involved in assaulting 
Rosario. That reduced any potential unfair prejudice.121 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting evidence of this assault. 
                                              
118 Bailey does not object to the district court’s on-the-record 
balancing with respect to the Rosario evidence. The district 
court included its Rule 403 determination for the Rosario 
evidence together with the non-video James murder evidence. 
And, as previously explained, the district court’s on-the-
record balancing with respect to this point was sufficient to 
merit deference. Therefore, we review the district court’s 
admission of this evidence for abuse of discretion. “The 
admission of evidence is an abuse of discretion if the district 
court’s action was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable, 
and we will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion 
unless no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s 
view.” United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
119 Gov’t Br. at 78. 
120 Id. 
121 See United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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C. Admission of Bailey’s Past Conviction under Rule 404(b) 
  
 Just weeks before the official “start” of the charged 
conspiracy, on September 4, 2010, Bailey was arrested with a 
.22 caliber semiautomatic handgun, loaded with five rounds 
of ammunition. He also had 20 grams of cocaine and $867 in 
cash in his possession. The government charged Bailey with 
unlawful possession of a handgun and unlawful possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of a 
public housing complex (i.e., the Stanley Homes Village). 
Bailey plead guilty to both charges in juvenile court.  
 At trial, the district court permitted the government to 
introduce evidence of this arrest and conviction. The parties 
agreed to a stipulation that Bailey’s firearm was operable. 
The parties further agreed that certain exhibits related to this 
incident—the firearm, ammunition, and a series of photos 
taken at the scene of the arrest—would be admitted in 
evidence. The district court admitted this evidence as being 
intrinsic to the charged conspiracy and, in the alternative, as 
an admissible prior crime under Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b). That rule allows evidence of uncharged past crimes to 
be admitted if it is not used to establish a defendant’s criminal 
propensity. Under the rule, such evidence “may be admissible 
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident.”122 Both at trial and now on 
appeal, Bailey challenges the admission of this evidence. 
Bailey argues that evidence was not intrinsic to the charged 
crimes and not admissible evidence of uncharged conduct 
under Rule 404(b). He also contends this evidence should 
have been excluded under Rule 403.  
1. Standard of Review 
As previously explained, we generally review district 
courts’ evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.123 
However, our review of whether evidence falls within the 
scope of Rule 404(b) is plenary.124 Once we determine that 
evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b), we review the 
                                              
122 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  
123 See United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 
2010).  
124 See id.  
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district court’s decision to admit the evidence for abuse of 
discretion. The “admission of evidence is an abuse of 
discretion if the district court’s action was arbitrary, fanciful 
or clearly unreasonable.”125 We “will not disturb a trial 
court’s exercise of discretion unless no reasonable person 
would adopt the district court’s view.”126 As is true with 
decisions under Rule 403, district courts are not entitled to 
this deferential standard of review when they fail to articulate 
non-propensity reasons for the admission of the contested 
evidence on-the-record.127 If the court admits evidence of 
uncharged acts, the district court must “articulate, with 
precision, a chain of inferences that does not contain a 
propensity link.”128 And, “[o]f course, ‘a mere recitation of 
the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2) is insufficient.’”129 When 
confronted with a proffer under Rule 404(b), a district court 
should “require the prosecution to explain exactly how the 
proffered evidence should work in the mind of a juror to 
establish the fact the government claims to be trying to 
prove.”130  
Here, the district court did articulate a chain of 
inferences that did not include propensity. At trial, Bailey 
argued that he should not be liable for the firearm charge 
because he did not have any knowledge that other DDTO 
members would carry guns, use guns, or discharge guns. 
Therefore, his knowledge was critical to the government’s 
                                              
125 United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
126 Id. 
127 See United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 294 (3d Cir. 
2014); United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 
2014), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2014); Unites States v. 
Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992).  
128 Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 277. 
129 Brown, 765 F.3d at 294 (quoting United States v. Davis, 
726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013)) and citing Christopher B. 
Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:28, at 
730 (“[I]t is lamentably common to see recitations of laundry 
lists of permissive uses, with little analysis or attention to the 
particulars.”)). 
130 Id.  
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case and conversely, his defense. The district court realized 
this and offered the following explanation of how Bailey’s 
past arrest shows something other than his mere propensity to 
carry weapons: 
[I]f three weeks . . . before the start of . . . the 
conspiracy, he is arrested with drugs . . . with 
intent to distribute, and he’s carrying a gun, 
that’s proof of his knowledge that in engaging 
in a drug conspiracy or drug transactions, that 
other members of the conspiracy will use guns 
in connection with the possession and 
distribution[;] . . . knowledge that it’s part of the 
warp and woof of the conspiracy that guns will 
be used to carry out the purposes of the 
conspiracy, which might be protection from 
those who would rob them of money, keeping 
out competition in the area where they operate, 
battling – forestalling apprehension, should they 
be confronted by the police. . . . [I]n this case, I 
think the knowledge prong is very important in 
that . . . the prosecution can argue to the jury 
that Mr. Bailey knew full well that in the drug 
business, particularly in that very area of 
Atlantic City, involved the possession of 
weapons, you know, for the sole reasons I just 
articulated a minute ago.131 
 
As the district court explained, Bailey’s conviction tends to 
demonstrate his knowledge that the drug business in this area 
of Atlantic City was a particularly violent enterprise; one 
where drug dealers were frequently armed. This is a valid, 
non-propensity reason to admit Bailey’s past conviction.  
2. Admissibility of Bailey’s Past Conviction Evidence under 
Rule 404(b) 
 
 Bailey argues that, contrary to the district court’s 
ruling, the evidence of his past conviction was not intrinsic. If 
the conviction evidence is intrinsic to the charged crimes, 
then we need not conduct the 404(b) analysis.132 Only 
                                              
131 Bailey J.A. 2228-29 (emphasis added). 
132 United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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extrinsic evidence is subject to Rule 404(b): intrinsic 
evidence does not constitute a prior bad act at all; instead, it 
directly proves the charged crime. In United States v. 
Green,133 we examined the difference between intrinsic and 
extrinsic evidence at length. There, we clarified:  
[W]e will reserve the “intrinsic” label for two 
narrow categories of evidence. First, evidence is 
intrinsic if it directly proves the charged 
offense. This gives effect to Rule 404(b)’s 
applicability only to evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts. If uncharged misconduct 
directly proves the charged offense, it is not 
evidence of some “other” crime. Second, 
uncharged acts performed contemporaneously 
with the charged crime may be termed intrinsic 
if they facilitate the commission of the charged 
crime. But all else must be analyzed under Rule 
404(b).134 
 
 The Bailey conviction fails to meet either definition of 
intrinsic evidence. First, Bailey’s prior arrest and conviction 
did not “directly prove” the charged offense. Bailey was 
arrested a month before the conspiracy even began. Bailey’s 
conviction could not directly prove Bailey’s role in a 
conspiracy that had not yet even begun.135 In addition, 
Bailey’s arrest was not contemporaneous with the charged 
crime. Although proof of conspiracies is not limited to the 
charged start and end dates, the indictment’s temporal 
parameters usually delineate the boundary between intrinsic 
and extrinsic evidence. Evidence outside the temporal bounds 
of the indicted conspiracy may still be admissible, if it 
satisfies the restrictions of Rule 404(b).  
                                              
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 248-49 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  
135 See United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (holding that evidence of an earlier-in-time crime that 
was nearly identical to and factually connected to a charge in 
the indictment could not be considered intrinsic evidence of 
the crime charged). This Court cited Bowie approvingly in 
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2010). 
41 
 
 Because Bailey’s past conviction was not intrinsic to 
the charged crimes, it should only have been admitted if 
consistent with Rule 404(b)’s requirements. To be admissible 
under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts 
must: (1) have a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it 
must be relevant under Rule 402; (3) its probative value must 
outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) if the 
defendant requests it, the court must instruct the jury to 
consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which 
it is admitted.136 Here, the second137 and fourth138 
requirements are undisputedly met. Accordingly, we only 
need to consider whether evidence of Bailey’s conviction had 
a proper evidentiary purpose and satisfied Rule 403. 
                                              
136 See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 
(1988); see also United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 
276-77 (3d Cir. 2014), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2014). 
137 Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 401. That definition is “very broad.” Gibson v. 
Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 232 (3d Cir. 
2004). Here, the fact that Bailey possessed cocaine with the 
intent to distribute while in possession of a firearm in the 
Stanley Holmes Village tends to show his awareness of 
firearm use during drug trafficking in that area.  
138 The district court instructed the jury that Bailey’s prior 
arrest and conviction “was admitted only for a limited 
purpose, that is, as evidence of Kareem Bailey’s knowledge 
or the reasonable foreseeability to Kareem Bailey of the use, 
carrying and/or possession of firearms in furtherance of drug 
trafficking.” Bailey J.A. 3516. The court specifically told the 
jury that it could “not consider the evidence that these other 
acts as a substitute for proof that he committed any of the 
crimes for which he is charged in this case. You may not 
consider this evidence as proof that Kareem Bailey has had—
has a bad character or any propensity to commit crimes. 
Specifically, you may not use this evidence to conclude that 
Kareem Bailey may have committed the other acts, he must 
have also committed the acts charged in the indictment.” 
Bailey J.A. 3518-19. The district court also gave a similar 
instruction in the final charge to the jury.  
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 The government claims that Bailey’s past conviction 
had a proper purpose because it tends to demonstrate that 
Bailey knew drug dealers in the Atlantic City area—
specifically the Stanley Holmes Village—frequently used 
firearms in the course of their trafficking activities. We agree.  
 The circumstances here are quite similar to those we 
considered in United States v. Boone.139 There, a defendant 
was charged with numerous offenses including conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine.140 At trial, he argued that he was merely an 
ignorant “go-fer” without any knowledge of the contents of 
the bags that he admitted delivering.141 The trial court allowed 
the government to introduce evidence of Boone’s two prior 
convictions for cocaine distribution to rebut his “go-fer” 
defense.142 We affirmed, noting that the evidence of his prior 
convictions was “admitted to show that Boone was familiar 
with drug-trafficking practices.”143 As we explained, Boone’s 
familiarity with drug trafficking practices and his ability to 
recognize cocaine and its packaging were relevant to the 
question of whether he knew what he was doing when he 
delivered bags of cocaine to certain people.144 
Like Boone, Bailey contests his knowledge of drug-
trafficking practices in Atlantic City. And, as in Boone, the 
government seeks to rely on Bailey’s past conviction to prove 
he did possess that knowledge. This chain of logic does not 
rely on improper propensity inferences. The temporal and 
geographic proximity of Bailey’s past conviction to the 
charged crime tends to show that Bailey knew drug traffickers 
in this area possessed firearms in the course of their drug 
trafficking.  
3. Admissibility of Bailey’s Past Conviction under 
Rule 403 
Finally, we must assess whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice associated with the evidence of Bailey’s past 
conviction substantially outweighed its probative value. 
Bailey has not contested the district court’s on-the-record 
                                              
139 279 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2002).  
140 Boone, 279 F.3d at 171. 
141 Id. at 187. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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balancing with respect to this issue, and we agree that it was 
sufficient. The district court discussed the probative value of 
Bailey’s past conviction while still acknowledging its 
potential for unfair prejudice. Therefore, we review the 
district court’s Rule 403 decision regarding Bailey’s past 
conviction for abuse of discretion.145  
 The risk of unfair prejudice inherent in the evidence of 
Bailey’s past conviction is obvious. It would have been 
difficult for the jurors to hear this evidence and not make the 
impermissible propensity inference. “Although the 
government will hardly admit it, the reasons proffered to 
admit prior bad act evidence may often be potemkin village, 
because the motive, we suspect, is often mixed between an 
urge to show some other consequential fact as well as to 
impugn the defendant’s character.”146  
Although this potential for unfair prejudice is 
significant, so too was the probative value of this evidence. 
As the district court recognized, this past conviction was 
directly relevant to Bailey’s knowledge that drug dealers at 
the Stanley Holmes Village used firearms. Bailey’s arrest one 
month prior to the charged conspiracy at the same location as 
the DDTO’s trafficking activity is compelling evidence of his 
knowledge. Without this past conviction, the government’s 
case for Bailey’s Pinkerton liability was significantly weaker. 
As previously discussed, the only other evidence of Bailey’s 
culpability on the firearm charge was 1) testimony from 
Young that Bailey possessed “firearms at times while he was 
selling drugs or engaged in the business of selling drugs in 
and around” the Stanley Holmes Village and other 
locations,147 and 2) evidence that after Bailey was arrested, 
                                              
145 See United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir. 
1992) (“When a court engages in a Rule 403 balancing and 
articulates on the record a rational explanation, we will rarely 
disturb its ruling. Where, however, the court failed to perform 
this analysis, or where its rationale is not apparent from the 
record, there is no way to review its discretion.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
146 Id. at 886. 
147 Bailey J.A. 2352. 
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Derry told Bailey on a phone call that he was glad that Bailey 
“wasn’t strapped” (armed) when he was arrested.148  
 Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court’s 
analysis and resulting conclusion regarding Bailey’s past 
conviction was “arbitrary or irrational.”149 In United States v. 
Vega,150 we affirmed the district court’s admission of 
evidence that the defendant—on trial for conspiracy to 
distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin—
participated in a drug conspiracy a few years earlier.151  
[T]he Government’s evidence of Vega’s 
participation in the 1997 drug conspiracy was of 
critical importance because Vega had denied 
knowledge of the [charged] 1999 conspiracy . . . 
. The evidence was highly probative in 
demonstrating that Vega knew he was receiving 
a drug package . . . and that he was connected to 
Jairo, who was a participant in both the 1997 
and [charged] 1999 conspiracies. Although the 
evidence undoubtedly had some prejudicial 
value, we cannot say that the Court abused its 
discretion by concluding that this prejudicial 
value was not so unfair as to outweigh its 
probative value.152  
 
We affirm the district court’s admission of the Bailey 
conviction.  
V. MISTRIAL CLAIMS 
 Lastly, Bailey, Macon, and Venable contend that the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied their 
motions for mistrials based on statements witnesses and the 
                                              
148 Supplemental Appendix at 31-32 (Government Exhibit 
192.1). 
149 United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 198 (3d Cir. 
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 285 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2002).  
151 Id. at 260. 
152 Id. at 263 (citing United States v. Palma–Ruedas, 121 F.3d 
841, 852 (3d Cir. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 526 U.S. 
275 (1999) and United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 
643-44 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
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government made at trial.153 Bailey and Venable argue that 
the district court should have declared a mistrial after a 
prosecution witness, Atlantic City Police Detective Thomas 
Holton, mentioned that DDTO associates sexually assaulted 
Anthony Rosario during the October 2010 attack. The 
prosecution had previously agreed not to introduce the 
“sexual assault aspect” of the Rosario attack at trial.154 When 
Detective Holton took the stand, he described his interview 
with Rosario and his mother after the attack. He testified that, 
“[t]he mother first did most the talking and then Anthony did 
some of the talking. The mother was visibly upset and 
shaken, as was Anthony. They advised that he was taken to a 
house, sexually assaulted—.”155 The government immediately 
cut Holton off, ending his explanation.156 But defense counsel 
objected, and all four defense counsel moved for a mistrial at 
sidebar.157 The district court denied the motion, but offered to 
give a limiting instruction. Defense counsel rejected this 
offer, fearing it might draw more attention to the improper 
testimony. The sexual assault issue never resurfaced at trial. 
 In reviewing the district court’s denial of the mistrial 
motion based Holton’s comments, we assess three factors. 
We consider: (1) whether the remarks were pronounced and 
persistent, (2) the strength of the other evidence, and (3) 
curative actions taken by the district court.158 Here, Detective 
Holton’s single, fleeting reference to the sexual nature of the 
Rosario assault did not generate the sort of prejudice that 
                                              
153 “We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial based on 
a witness's allegedly prejudicial comments for an abuse of 
discretion.” United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 335-36 (3d 
Cir. 2010), as amended (Oct. 21, 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
154 Bailey J.A. 2240-41. 
155 Bailey J.A. at 3228. 
156 Id.  
157 During the sidebar, the prosecutor indicated that he had 
not had time to speak with Detective Holton that morning 
because Holton had been running late. The prosecution also 
clarified that it had no intention of bringing out that 
testimony, which it had previously agreed not to elicit.  
158 Riley, 621 F.3d at 336. 
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necessitates a mistrial.159 The government promptly cut off 
Detective Holton’s testimony, and the jury did not receive 
any details regarding this issue. Furthermore, Holton’s 
comment did not in any way suggest that any of these four 
defendants were involved in this attack on Rosario. 
Accordingly, we reject the contention that this statement 
should have resulted in a mistrial.  
 Venable also argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in failing to grant a mistrial on the basis of a 
second inconsequential remark. During their investigation of 
the DDTO, two officers collected spent .22 shell casings from 
the scene of a shooting at the home of Barbara German. At 
trial, Kareem Young testified that he observed Venable with a 
firearm on multiple occasions, in particular a .22 caliber rifle 
with a sawed-off barrel. Young also testified that Venable 
admitted to him that Venable was involved in the Barbara 
German shooting. Towards the end of the defendants’ trial, 
forensic examiners discovered that the spent shell casing from 
the German shooting matched Venable’s .22 caliber rifle. 
Because of the late disclosure of this report, the government 
agreed that it would not present evidence of that ballistic 
match or the “head stamp” (a distinctive marking on the top 
of a bullet) of the recovered shell casing.  
 Nevertheless, at trial, Detective Michael Tracy 
accidentally testified that he discovered a casing of a “.22 
caliber, head stamp super X”160 bullet at the scene of the 
German shooting. The prosecutor immediately cut Tracy off 
and told him: “don’t get into the head stamp.”161 Venable 
objected, and moved for a mistrial.162 The district court 
denied the motion.  
 Nothing in Tracy’s testimony or any other witness’s 
testimony connected Venable’s .22 caliber rifle to the “super 
                                              
159 See United States v. Long, 748 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 
2014) (single fleeting reference to a murder unconnected to 
the case introduced inadvertently and never discussed again 
over the course of a lengthy trial does not give rise to a 
mistrial). 
160 Bailey J.A. 3472. 
161 Id. 
162 The prosecutor indicated that the witness had been 
instructed not to mention the head stamps.  
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X” head stamp. It is unlikely that the jurors even understood 
the relevance of Tracy’s reference. Therefore, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Venable’s motion 
for a mistrial. 
 Finally, Macon contends that the government 
constructively amended its indictment during its rebuttal 
summation, entitling the defendants to a mistrial. During 
summation, Macon’s attorney displayed a photograph of 
Macon with a group of men who were DDTO rivals. Macon’s 
counsel argued that the photograph proved Macon was not a 
DDTO associate because if he were, he would not have posed 
with rival gang members. In rebuttal, the government argued 
that the photograph had been taken in mid-March 2013, after 
Mykal Derry had already been arrested and the “Derry 
brothers’ reign on the streets of Atlantic City [was] coming to 
a close.”163 The indictment charged that the drug-trafficking 
conspiracy ran until the end of March 2013. Macon asserts 
that the government’s statement regarding the Derry’s 
brothers’ “reign” constructively amended the indictment by 
shortening the period of the alleged conspiracy.  
 The argument hardly merits discussion. The 
government never asserted that the conspiracy had formally 
ended in mid-March 2013. It merely posited the common-
sense inference that Mykal Derry’s influence had waned due 
to his incarceration. Furthermore, Macon’s arguments missed 
the point of the constructive amendment doctrine. The bar on 
constructive amendments seeks to ensure that the jury does 
not convict the defendant for uncharged conduct.164 Here, the 
government’s rebuttal argument actually narrowed the scope 
of the conspiracy, which, if anything, may have assisted the 
defendant rather than prejudiced him. Accordingly, we find 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Macon’s motion for a mistrial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgments of conviction of each of these four defendants. 
                                              
163 Bailey J.A. 4689. 
164 United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1985).  
